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RECENT CASE NOTES
purposes to which such street was formerly applied, but those demanded
by new improvements and new wants." In Elliott on Roads and Streets,
4th Ed. Vol. 1 Sec. 20 it is said "The right of the public is by no means
confined to the surface of the way, and this all who set apart land for a
street are conclusively presumed to know. 'Street' means more than sur-
face, it means the whole surface and so much of the depth as is and can
be used, not unfairly, for the ordinary purposes of a street." Again, the
principle is expounded, as follows: "The lot owners rights are subject to
the paramount right of the public, and the rights of the public are not
limited to a mere right of way, but extended ... to all beneficial, legitimate
street uses, as the public good or convenience may from time to time re-
quire. The use of the streets . might be seriously affected by the recog-
nition of a right of an abutting owner to make at pleasure openings in, or
even under the street or sidewalk, except subject to unreasonable regula-
tions." Dillon-Mlunicipal Corporations (14th Ed.) p. 699.
The abutting owner cannot complain for consequential damage done by
change of grade or other improvements, if there is no negligence or lack of
skill or added burden. Morris v. City of Indianapolis, 177 Ind. 369; Snyder
v. Town of Rockport, 6 Ind. 236; Macy v. City of Indianapolis.
Hence it appears that the abutting owner cannot complain for conse-
quential damage done by improving the street unless there is an additional
servitude, negligence or lack of skill, and that the change is of a sidewalk
or part thereof to use as part of the street for vehicular traffic is not an
added burden or servitude for which there must be compensation-also that
the use and control of the easement is not limited merely to the surface but
extends as far below and above as is necessary to the use of the city for
street purposes.
The case of Coburn v. New Telephone Co., 156 Ind. 90, though not cited
by the court in the opinion in the case under discussion, is almost directly
in point, except that there the abutter had not completed the vault under
the sidewalk, but the additional use imposed was even more questionable
than here, being the laying of a telephone cable five feet under the sidewalk,
encased in a concrete vault; of course done with permisson of the city.
The court held there was no additional servitude, nor taking of property
without compensation and claimed recovery.
So the principal case is supported in its legal principals by almost
universal authority as well as direct Indiana precedent.
E. M.
COURTS--APPELLATE JURISDICTION OF CIRCUIT CouRTs OF APPEALs-
FINAL DECREE OR JUDGAENT-Plaintiff below brought an action in a Dis-
trict Court of the United States which he designated as a bill in equity
for recovery for breach of contract. The lower court found that the al-
leged contract between the plaintiff and defendant was a good and valid
one, that the defendant had breached the provisions thereof, and that the
plaintiff was entitled to recover. It was then decreed that the defendant
render a full, true, and accurate account of all due to the plaintiff under
said contract, and pay the same to plaintiff with interest. The case was
referred to a master in chancery to ascertain and report to the court the
amount due to the plaintiff in accordance with the above decree, the plain-
tiff to have judgment for such amount as the master's report would show
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"provided said master's report is approved by this court." This is an at-
tempted appeal from this decree. Held, Appeal dismissed for want of juris-
diction. Dodge Mfg. Co. et al. v. Patten, Circuit Court of Appeals, Seventh
Circuit, Sept. 30, 1930, 43 Fed. (2nd) 472.
This case gives riseto an opportunity to consider the jurisdiction of
Circuit Courts of Appeals in regard to appeals from lower courts. The
jurisdiction of such courts is wholly statutory. Emlenton Refining Co. v.
Chambers, 14 Fed. (2nd) 104. Furthermore, the implication in an act of
Congress to confer jurisdiction must be not only clear, but a necessary one.
Idem. With these points in mind, the appellate jurisdiction of said courts
may be analyzed and determined from the following summary of the stat-
utes thereon.
It is provided that "the circuit courts of appeal shall have appellate
jurisdiction to review by appeal or writ of error final decisions" in the
district courts, in all cases save where there is express provision for a direct
review in the Supreme Court. Judicial Code, Sec. 128, amended; 28 USCA,
Sec. 225.
Said courts have in addition certain powers of review over interlocu-
tory orders or decrees of district courts. In case of an interlocutory order
or decree of a district court that grants, continues, modifies, refuses, or
dissolves an injunction, an appeal may be taken to the circuit court of
appeals. If an application to dissolve or modify an injunction is refused,
an appeal may be taken. The same may be done in case of an interlocutory
order or decree appointing a receiver, or one refusing an order to wind
up a pending receivership or to take appropriate steps to accomplish the
purposes of said receivership. Such appeal must be applied for within
thirty days after the entry of the order or decree. 28 USCA, Sec. 227.
The aforesaid courts have appellate and supervisory jurisdiction in bank-
.ruptcy proceedings. "The circuit courts of appeals of the United States
.. . are invested with appellate jurisdiction of controversies arising in
bankruptcy proceedings from the courts of bankruptcy from which they
have appellate jurisdiction in other cases." 11 USCA, Sec. 47.
The several courts of appeals have jurisdiction in equity either inter-
locutory or final, to superintend and revise in matter of law the provisions
of the several inferior courts of bankruptcy within their jurisdiction. This
power may be exercised on due notice and petition by any party aggrieved.
Idem. In the following cases appeals in bankruptcy proceedings may be
taken: "(1) from a judgment adjudging or refusing to adjudge the de-
fendant a bankrupt; (2) from a judgment granting or denying a dis-
charge; (3) from a judgment allowing or rejecting a debt or. claim of
$500.00 or over," appeal to be made within ten days after the judgment
appealed from has been rendered. 11 USCA, Sec. 48.
Said courts are empowered to enforce, set aside, or modify orders of
the Interstate Commerce Commission, the Federal Reserve Board, and the
Federal Trade Commission. 28 USCA, Sec. 225, par. (e). As to the Fed-
eral Trade Commission, the statute is as follows: "If such person, part-
nership, or corporation fails or neglects to obey such orders of the com-
mission while the same are in effect, the commission may apply to circuit
courts of appeals of the U. S. within any circuit where the method of
competition in question was used or where such person, partnership, or
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corporation resides or carries on its business, for the enforcement of its
order." Idem.
Also it is provided that "any party required by such order of the com-
mission to cease and desist from using such methods of competition may
obtain a review of such order in said circuit court of appeals by filing in
the court a written petition praying that the order of the commission be
set aside." 15 USCA, Sec. 45.
Substantially the same words are applied to orders of the Interstate
Commerce Commission and the Federal Reserve Board. 15 USCA, Sec. 21.
Review of a decision of a district court of the United States within one
of the said States shall be in the circuit court of appeals for the circuit
embracing the particular state. 28 USCA, Sec. 225, par. (d).
No attempt is here made to outline the appellate jurisdiction of the
circuit courts in regard to decisions of United States courts outside the
United States, such as the district courts for Alaska, the Virgin Islands,
the Canal Zone, the Supreme Courts of the Territory of Hawaii and of
Porto Rico, or the United States Court for China. Said jurisdiction may
be readily traced by referring to 28 USCA, Sec. 225.
In view of this brief summary of the statutes, the principal case was
easily and correctly decided. The statutes provided that in such case as
this the decree of the district court must be a final one. That this is indis-
pensable has been held by O'Brien v. Lashar, 266 Fed. 215; Crooker v.
Knudsen, 232 Fed. 857; McLish v. Roff, 141 U. S. 661, and countless others.
This leaves the sole question as to whether a reference to a master as in
the principal case constitutes a final decree.
"The rule .. .for determining whether, for the purposes of an appeal,
a decree is final, is, in brief, whether the decree disposes of the entire con-
troversy between the parties." La Bourgogne, 210 U. S. 95, 28 S. Ct. 664.
On the other hand, a "final decree" is not necessarily the last order in a
case, as orders sometimes follow merely for the purpose of carrying out
or executing the matters which the decree has determined; but when it
finally fixes the rights of the parties, it is final. Gas and Electric Secur-
ities Co. v. Manhattan and Queens Traction Corp., 266 Fed. 625, 632. Here,
however, there was something more than a mere carrying into effect the
terms of a complete decree. The reference to the master was to determine
by an accounting what the defendant was to pay, and said accounting was
subject to the approval of the court. In such cases it has been consistently
held that although it has already been decreed that the defendant is liable,
such decree does not determine the extent of the plaintiff's rights, and is
not final. Parsons v. Robinson, 122 U. S. 112; Lodge v. Twell, 135 U. S.
232, 10, S. Ct. 745; Latta v. Kilbourn, 150 U. S. 524, 14 S. Ct. 201; Mac-
farland v. Brown, 187 U. S. 239, 23 S. Ct. 105.
P. J. D.
RECEIVERS-APPOINTMENT WITHOUT NOTICE-SUFFICIENT CAUSE-Plain-
tiff filed amended verified complaint seeking appointment of a receiver for
defendant. Defendant was not served with summons. A receiver was ap-
pointed on the day the amended complaint was filed, and furnished bond
for $1000 which was approved. Defendant filed exceptions to the appoint-
ment of receiver without notice. Appointment set aside. The court de-
